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TEXAS LAW REVIEW
responsibility; the Bureau is now faced with the impossible task of
fulfilling that responsibility on a budget already stretched to the break-
ing point. Experienced conservationists know that conservation always
costs something; if efforts to obtain an emergency appropriation fail,
the long-awaited program for wild horses and burros may come to
nothing.
Legislation to protect and manage wild horses and burros by
placing them under federal jurisdiction has followed a tenuous path,
with public interest and action finally prevailing. Those of us in the
forefront of the battle only showed the way. We did not achieve all that
we set out to achieve, and we are not yet sure that what has been gained
will provide an adequate program; we must wait and watch. The people
of America have fought hard to save this colorful remnant of two animal
species that so uniquely represent the American spirit-freedom, pride,
independence, endurance, and the ability to survive against unbeliev-
able odds. Should the future of these animals remain in doubt, the
fight will go on.
THE LAST TREATISE
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLicr OF LAWS. By Russell J. Weintraub.
Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1971. Pp. xviii, 494.
$13.50.
Reviewed by Robert Allen Sedler*
Some years ago Professor Charles Alan Wright observed that "[o]n
a generous estimate one litigated case out of every hundred may involve
a question of the conflict of laws. Yet the subject of the conflict of laws
has attracted the best thinking and the most diligent research of a
host of capable scholars. Magnificent treatises explore its every intri-
cacy; fruitful theories abound by which it may be explained and un-
derstood and reshaped .... I" Russell J. Weintraub's Commentary on
the Conflict of Laws, the latest treatise worthy of Professor Wright's
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B., Pittsburgh, 1956; J.D., 1959.
I Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 876 (1955).
Compare "tongue in cheek" (hopefully), Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIc. L. Rrnv.
959, 971 (1953): "The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious
matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon."
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description, will take its place among the works of the other leading
conflicts theorists.2
The book is a remarkable piece of scholarship. In an extremely
well-organized and very readable manner Professor Weintraub shows
how courts have dealt with conflicts problems in actual cases, sets forth
existing law, and analyzes present and proposed solutions to a variety
of conflicts problems, all the while developing with precision and clarity
his own functional analysis. He blends all of this together, shifting from
one objective to another almost imperceptibly and presenting somehow
the picture of an integrated whole.
At the base of functional analysis is a consideration of the policies
and interests of the concerned states, and Professor Weintraub here
draws on the governmental interest approach developed by the late
Brainerd Currie.3 Professor Weintraub further develops governmental
interest by applying it to all areas of conflicts law. Differing from Pro-
fessor Currie, he tries to come up with a "rational solution to the true
conflict, focusing on policies and trends in the development of the law
that the jurisdictions share" (p. 39).
Significantly, because through outstanding research and thinking
capable theorists have now established a basic framework of scholarship
upon which future commentators can build, this may be the last com-
plete treatise on the conflict of laws for some time. In addition, because
our present emphasis on law as an instrument of social change has less-
ened the importance of the traditional subjects in the law school cur-
riculum, particularly those related to private dispute settlement, many
of the younger (which for obviously personal reasons I define as under
40) academicians may be unwilling to make the kind of intellectual and
personal commitment it takes to produce a treatise such as Commen-
tary on the Conflict of Laws.
The emphasis now should turn to variations on the differing themes
and upon the development of sound solutions to particular conflicts
problems. Perhaps then, with the publication of Weintraub's Commen-
tary, we are at the end of one era of conflicts scholarship and at the be-
ginning of a new one. If so, a somewhat different kind of review may
be appropriate for what I would call the "last great treatise." I will indi-
cate my personal reaction to a number of Professor Weintraub's ideas,
and more importantly, will use the book as a vehicle for developing my
2 E.g., J. BEALE, THE CoNFcrt OF LAws (1935) (3 vol.); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAw
PROCESS (1965); W. Coor, THE LOGICAL AND LEGALBASEs OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942);
B. CuRR, SE LcrD ESsAYs ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws (1963); A. EHUZNzWm, PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1967); A. EHRENzwEiG, CONFLICT OF LAws (1962); H. GOODRICH & E. ScoLEs,
CONFLICT OF LAws (1964); R. LEsAtR, AmERrcAN CONFLICTS LAw (1968); E. LORENZEN,
SELECT ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT oF LAws (1947); G. STumBERG, CoNFLIrt OF LAWS (3d
ed. 1963).
3 See generally B. Cuum, supra note 2.
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own ideas as to the proper solution of conflicts problems, particularly in
Torts and Contracts.
I. OBSERVATIONS AND RESPONSES
Professor Weintraub's use of functional analysis in the property
area was particularly impressive. He demonstrates very cogently what
I had always felt-that interest analysis could be employed effectively
consistent with the need for certainty that purportedly exists in fields
such as property. He shows the irrelevancy of domicile as such by indi-
cating that, under functional analysis, each of the classic domicile cases4
points to only one state whose law should be applied.5 In Chapter 8
he deftly works a series of examples showing that the situs qua situs
often has no interest in applying its law to determine questions of suc-
cession or transfer of land.6 Particularly in the succession area he em-
ploys functional analysis to point out false conflicts, resolve true ones,
and show that sometimes there is no conflict at all.7
Little attention is given to the substance-procedure problem except
in the discussion of statutes of limitations. The omission is significant.
Analytically the substance-procedure problem, or what I would prefer
to call "extent of incorporation," arises only after the forum has decided
to displace its own law. Since the forum cannot for all purposes become
a court of the other state, it must draw the line at some point in decid-
ing how much of the other state's law it will incorporate as a model for
the rule of decision. The line has traditionally been drawn by reference
to the substance-procedure dichotomy." Under the traditional rules, of
course, the forum was often forced to displace its own law even in cases
where it had a strong interest in applying it. This meant not only that
substance-procedure questions would arise with some frequency, but
4 Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790,
8 S.E. 596 (1888); In re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692.
5 In each of these cases the law of that state was not applied.
6 Once false constitutional dogmas concerning jurisdiction of subject matter are
swept aside, a functional analysis reveals that the situs qua situs, with rare excep-
tions, has an interest in applying its own law to affect the interest of persons in
property only when choice of law will affect the use of the land. Even when land
use is affected as between states of the United States, the situs rule should probably
yield to the conflicting rule of another state that has a genuine interest in validat-
ing a transaction that the situs would invalidate (p. 338).
For example, according to Professor Weintraub, the situs should not apply its rule
against perpetuiies to invalidate a transfer that satisfies the perpetuities rule of the state
where the claimants are resident because, "The differences between the perpetuities rules
of the various states are differences in detail rather than of basic policy" (p. 321).
7 For example, when both the situs and the state of residence have rules prohibiting
bequests of land to charities, but the rule of the situs is contained in a "deathbed disin-
heritance" statute and the rule of the state of residence is contained in a "mortmain"
statute, neither state has an interest in applying its particular invalidating rule here, and
since both states have a general policy of giving effect to the intention of the testator, the
bequest should be upheld (p. 30).
8 REsrATEMENT OF ThE CONFuCr OF LAws § 585 (1934).
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that the forum would be tempted to characterize an obviously "sub-
stantive" issue as "procedural" in order to apply its own law. Thus
procedural characterization quickly became a favorite manipulative
technique.9 At various times spousal immunity,10 survival of actions,"
and limitations on wrongful death recovery12 all came to be character-
ized as matters of "procedure." A functional approach will relegate
these mutants to obscurity, since the forum will displace its own law
only when it considers such a result desirable. Some years ago I argued
that the Erie "outcome-determinative" test should be employed in con-
flicts cases to deal with the problem of "extent of incorporation."' 3 This
accords with Professor Weintraub's functional definition of "procedure"
(pp. 46-48), and with the approach the courts appear to be taking. Func-
tional analysis clearly goes a long way toward solving the "pervasive
problem" of substance and procedure.
Professor Weintraub makes a very interesting point in suggesting
that the forum state look to the choice of law decisions of other involved
states. The "pervasive problem" of the renvoi can arise as such only
when the forum is operating under rigid choice of law rules-the
forum's choice of law rule refers it to a state whose own choice of law
rule looks back to the forum. Traditionally courts solved the problem
by rejecting the renvoi; the forum looked only to the other state's sub-
stantive law indicated by the forum state's choice of law rule and
ignored the other state's choice of law rule.14 The long practice of
"rejecting the renvoi" appears to have created a judicial mind set
against looking to another state's choice of law decisions. Professor
Weintraub contends that those decisions may assist a functional analysis
by underlining the real policy behind the other state's law. Thus in
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,15 for example, the Wisconsin
court, by looking to the California court's decision in Emery v. Emery,16
could have determined that the policy behind California's spousal im-
munity rule was really a community property policy applicable only to
9 See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered
Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. LJ. 27, 50-51 (1967). Other popular manipulative techniques were
"disingenuous characterization" of the principal question and the "public policy" excep-
tion. Id. at 48-50, 51-53.
10 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E2d 597 (1936).
11 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See the frank admission of
what was done in Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary, 37 TEXAs L. Rv. 657, 670
n.35 (1959).
12 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
The court recanted the following year in Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d
902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
Is Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Con-flict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 837 (1962).
14 RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLCr OF LAws § 7(b) (1934).
157 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
16 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
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California spouses. 17 California would thus have no interest in applying
its immunity rule to Wisconsin' spouses involved in an accident in
California. The case clearly presented a false conflict.18
Professor Weintraub notes, however, that it is impossible to obtain
functional information from the foreign choice-of-law rule when it is
cast in a "rigid territorial mold":
Such a territorially-oriented conflicts rule, by its nature, selects
a geographical location as the source of the applicable law
without first requiring inquiry into either the content of that
law or that law's underlying policies. For example, if the mari-
tal domicile permits spouses to sue one another for negligence,
but determines this question in conflicts cases by the law of the
place of the wrong, this choice of law rule cannot reasonably
be read as a functional decision to defer to the superior inter-
ests of the place of the wrong (p. 57).
Under functional analysis this case presents an obviously false conflict;'19
this being so, the forum state should apply its own law and allow recov-
ery. Professor Weintraub's position seems to be that it should do so
even though the other state, if suit were brought there, would decide
the issue in accordance with the substantive law of the forum. 20 Here,
I cannot agree. I would contend that where the state whose law is to be
used as a model would follow the substantive law of the forum, for
whatever reason, the forum should not displace its own law because
there is simply no conflict of laws. I see the law of the forum as the basic
law, which should not be displaced in the absence of a determination
by the forum court that a conflict of laws exists and that there are valid
reasons for displacement. In the above example there is an apparent
conflict of laws when the "domestic" rules of the states are considered,
but this conflict dissolves in light of the choice of law decisions of the
17 At that time California held that recovery of damages for personal injuries by a
spouse was community property, so that the negligent spouse would be in effect "profiting
from his own wrong." See Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956).
I8 By looking to the choice of law decisions it was possible to "end armchair specula-
tion about the California policies" (p. 55).
19 The marital domicile has art interest in allowing its resident to recover, and the
state of injury has no interest in protecting the "family harmony" of nonresident spouses,
or more accurately, the interest of the nonresident insurer. See Sedler, Characterization,
Identification of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise
in Judicial Method, 2 RTGnERs-CAMF L. Rpv. 8,52-54 (1970).
20 He does say that when the forum is "neutral, having no policy of its own to ad-
vance," and "all of the states that have contacts with the parties and with the transaction
would reach the same solution to the choice-of-law problem," then, "[t]he neutral forum
should mirror this result although it believes it foolishly dysfunctional, providing, of
course, that the result is not so outrageous as to be unconstitutional" (p. 57). While the
forum here has no policy of its own to advance, it does have contacts with the transaction,
since the accident occurred there, and it is not the "disinterested third state." I doubt that
Professor Weintraub intended the exception to apply here.
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other state.2 1 My emphasis on the law of the forum as the basic law, and
my view that the function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute before
it, dealing only with conflicts questions when absolutely necessary, leads
me to the position that the forum should not displace its own law when
the only other concerned state would decide the issue in accordance
with the substantive law of the forum.2
Professor Weintraub has devoted most of his chapter on constitu-
tional limitations on choice of law to a discussion of due process and
full faith and credit. He points out that the due process clause does not
prohibit the application of the law of a state having no interest in
applying its law, when that law is chosen on the basis of territorially-
oriented choice of law rules, and when the accident happened in that
state (p. 388).23 However, he also raises the equal protection issue:
Another form of equal protection problem arises if the forum
would refuse to apply its own law to its own residents because
the forum's traditional choice-of-law rule points to some other
geographical location as having the decisive "contact." Such
a refusal may be based upon an unreasonable classification of
forum residents if the policies underlying the forum rule
would be advanced by applying it and if such application
would not interfere with the legitimate interests of any other
state or unfairly surprise any party (pp. 425-26).
Thus a forum-state wife injured by her husband in the forum would
recover while one similarly injured in another state would not recover
in light of the forum's territorially-oriented choice of law rule. This
example illustrates Professor Weintraub's conclusion that "[t]he time
may be approaching when discriminating in the treatment of two forum
state wives because they were injured in different states will be recog-
nized as the kind of irrational classification that runs afoul of the equal
protection clause" (p. 425).24 1 would agree fully. Future constitutional
challenges on grounds of equal protection and "privileges and immuni-
ties" 25 may invalidate certain applications of territorially-oriented
choice of law rules. In this example, then, I would argue that neither the
21 See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457,
469 (1924).
22 See Sedler, supra note 9, at 95-101.
28 See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1965), recognizing the "constitutional interest"
of the state of injury in applying its law to allow recovery to a nonresident injured there,
even though the injury "may have cast no burden on her or her institutions."
24 See generally Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 1 (1960).
25 This is the "comity clause" of Art. IV, § 2, not to be confused with the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Pro-
fessor Weintraub does not discuss this guarantee apart from equal protection. See generally
Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and
Immunities, 69 YwA L.J. 1323 (1960).
1972] 1069
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
state of injury nor the parties' home state could apply the immunity rule
of the state of injury to deny recovery.
Professor Weintraub makes a very important-and to my knowl-
edge unique-point with respect to the constitutionality of the forum
applying its own statute of limitations. He contends that for a disinter-
ested forum to allow a suit not barred by its own statute of limitations,
but barred in the only interested state, violates due process (p. 398).
The logic is unassailable, and it is surprising that this point has not
occurred to any court that has applied the forum's longer statute to
allow a suit admittedly "governed" by the law of another state.26 The
forum is justified in barring a suit under its shorter statute of limita-
tions in order to implement its procedural policy against stale claims
(p. 396-97),27 but by definition it can have no procedural policy qua
forum in allowing a suit in which it otherwise has no interest. Some
years ago, I argued that the forum should disallow such suits whether
or not a borrowing statute28 was applicable, 29 but it never occurred to
me-despite what I thought was a sensitivity to constitutional issues-
that to allow such a suit could well be unconstitutional.
Professor Weintraub argues that the full faith and credit clause8"
requires balancing the state's interest in applying its own law against
the need for national uniformity (p. 411). While the full faith and
credit clause clearly does not justify weighing the interests of one state
against another (pp. 402-04),31 Professor Weintraub's "state interest-
national uniformity interest" analysis makes tolerable, if not palatable,
the result in cases such as Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Wolfe.32 There may be disagreement with the view that full faith and
credit should operate as an independent limitation on choice of law at
a1183 -a view that I think I share-but if it does, Professor Weintraub
has crafted a clear rationale and a sound guide to its application.
II. THE CHAPTER ON ToRTs
It is no easy task to compress a discussion of choice of law in con-
flict torts cases into some sixty pages, particularly when the discussion
includes not only an overview of the most swiftly and dramatically
changing area of the law, but also a development of the author's own
26 See, e.g., Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
27 See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
28 Such a law makes the foreign statute applicable at the forum (pp. 49-50).
29 Sedler, supra note 13, at 850.
SO U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
31 See Carroll v. Tanza, 349 US. 408 (1965); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 806 US. 493 (1939).
32 331 US. 586 (1947).
33 See Walker, Symposium: Criticism of Weintraub's Presentation of Full Faith and
Credit to Laws. - IowA L. REv. - (1972).
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approach. But Professor Weintraub has managed to do it. He has also
performed a very valuable service by reminding us that the place-of-
wrong rule has not disappeared, as academic commentary would some-
times indicate, citing ten jurisdictions that have expressly refused to
abandon the place-of-wrong rule (p. 237 n.43). He demonstrates co-
gently the unsoundness of the results that were reached in a number of
place-of-wrong cases in comparison with the results that would be
reached under interest analysis.
In view of the effectiveness of this kind of analysis, I am disap-
pointed that Professor Weintraub did not consider more fully the
"state of the most significant relationship" approach of the Restatement
Second, particularly in comparison with interest analysis. His brief dis-
cussion displays ambivalence toward the policy content of the Restate-
ment Second approach, and fails to accentuate the difference between
its localizing, contact-oriented methodology and the methodology of
interest analysis.8 4 This is really my only criticism as to the content of
the chapter. Professor Weintraub has set forth his own approach most
clearly and concisely, and somehow has managed to focus on the pan-
oply of recurring problems.
My own approach to choice of law in conflicts torts cases departs
from Professor Weintraub's analysis in two basic situations.3 5 Like Pro-
fessor Weintraub, I believe that interest analysis is the soundest way
to go about solving conflicts problems, particularly in the torts area.
However, unlike Professor Weintraub, I adhere to Professor Currie's
view that in the case of a true conflict-which I define a bit differently
from Professor Currie, emphasizing real as opposed to hypothetical in-
terests38-the forum should apply its own law. Furthermore, I am very
much concerned with judicial method and with the behavior of courts
in dealing with the kinds of cases that actually arise. I submit that con-
flicts cases, particularly in the torts area, fall into certain fact-law pat-
terns, and that courts can resolve these cases on considerations of policy
and fairness to the parties. Their decisions in particular cases will serve
as precedents for future ones, and in time a judicially established body
of conflicts law may emerge. This orientation causes me to analyze aca-
demic solutions with reference to their impact on and relevancy for
judicial behavior in conflicts cases.
Professor Weintraub's approach, here as elsewhere, calls first for
identifying and eliminating false or spurious conflicts and then for
34 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), discussed at
length in another context (pp. 239-44), would be a good example of this difference.
85 See generally Sedler, supra note 9; Sedler, supra note 19; Sedler, The Territorial
Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DUQUFSNE U. L.
REV. 394 (1971).
36 See Sedler, Symposium: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TExAs L. Rxv. 224,
225 (1971).
10711972]
providing a rational basis for resolving true ones. A spurious conflict
is present "when two or more jurisdictions, having some contact with
the parties or the occurrence, have tort rules pointing to different re-
sults, but upon analysis of the purposes underlying the putatively rele-
vant and divergent rules, it becomes apparent that one rule and one
rule only is rationally applicable to the case in issue" (p. 201). Spurious
conflicts arise when one state would substantially and legitimately ad-
vance its own policies if its rule were applied, while the contacts of the
other states are such that their policies, if given effect, "would officiously
interfere with the policies of the first state" (p. 201). Classic examples
of spurious conflicts include an accident involving two spouses from
a non-immunity state occurring in a state that still recognizes spousal
immunity and a similar accident in a state that does not have a guest
statute involving two parties from a state that does (pp. 221, 228).
Spurious and true conflicts are not separated by a sharp dividing
line, but occupy opposite ends of "a spectrum of torts conflicts situa-
tions;" and "[b]etween these extremes," Professor Weintraub writes,
"are cases in which reasonable men may differ as to whether more than
one state's policies are relevant" (p. 202). Unfortunately, Professor
Weintraub drops the matter at this point and moves on to the true
conflict, leaving an important gap in his approach. I think explicit
attention should be given to what Professor Currie has called the "un-
provided-for case," in which neither state has an interest in applying its
law on the issue in controversy.37 For example, a State A decedent is
killed in State A while operating a machine manufactured in State B
by a State B corporation. State A has a limitation on the amount of
damages recoverable for wrongful death; State B does not. The case
presents neither a false conflict nor a true one, because neither state has
an interest in applying its law on the particular issue: State A has no
interest in applying its limitation policy for the benefit of the State B
defendant; State B has no interest in allowing unrestricted recovery to
the beneficiaries of a State A decedent killed in State A.38
Professor Weintraub does not deal explicitly with this kind of case,
a significant omission since these cases do arise in practice. In treating
this situation, I would consider policies other than those reflected in
the differing laws themselves. For example, all states impose liability
for wrongful death, and limitations on this liability are exceptional.
This being so, when the only state interested in limiting defendant's
liability-his home state, where he will be required to bear the loss or
carry insurance to cover it-does not do so, the common policy of both
37 See B. CURrE, supra note 2, at 152-53.
38 See Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969); cf.
Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971).
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states in permitting recovery for wrongful death should be respected
and unlimited recovery should be allowed. As a general proposition in
accident cases, when defendant's home state imposes tort liability, he
should be held liable irrespective of where the plaintiff resides or where
the accident occurs.
In the wrongful death example, Professor Weintraub first ques-
tions whether states do share a common policy of allowing recovery for
wrongful death in view of the "great variations in the way different
states compute wrongful death damages, some providing very generous
recoveries, some far less."8 9 But when both states have identical mea-
sures of wrongful death recovery except that one has a statutory limit
on damages-which he says is unlikely40 -he would agree with my view,
taking the position that "[t]he remainder of the wrongful death recov-
ery of the decedent's domicile is applicable sans the limit on recovery
because the decedent's domicile at death will advance its compensation
policies by providing full compensation to the surviving dependents,"
and "[f]ull recovery will advance the policies of the decedent's last
domicile and will not conflict with the policies of the defendant's domi-
cile."41
He also makes the point that, "[w]hen the only two contact states
share identical policies, but one state has an exception to that policy, if
the reasons underlying the exception are inapplicable, it is highly likely
that at least one of the states will have a significant interest in having
the shared policy applied."42 This point is well taken and furnishes a
sound means of analyzing the significance of what I have called "policies
other than those reflected in the differing laws themselves." 43 I think
Professor Weintraub and I would take essentially the same approach
to resolving the unprovided-for case, and I wish that he had developed
this aspect more fully as an integral part of his functional analysis of
tort problems.
When it comes to the true conflict, Professor Weintraub would not
"give up and apply the law of the forum" (p. 203). I fully agree with
his view that a true conflict exists when each state has a legitimate and
real interest in having its own rule applied. He distinguishes, as I do,
between real and hypothetical interests, pointing out that when two
89 Symposium: Response to the Critiques of Professors Sedler, Twerski, and Walker,
- IOWA L. Rav. - (1972).
40 He says this because the limit on damages will probably have made it unnecessary for
the courts in the low-limit state to resolve many of the hard problems of computing
wrongful death recovery concerning which there are substantial splits of authority and
which the courts in the no-limit state have had to decide. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 My statement that "no state has an interest in applying its law on the particular
issue" refers only to the differing laws and does not preclude recognition of a state's
interest in having the shared policy applied.
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parties from an immunity state-for example, a state that has a guest
statute-are involved in an accident in a nonimmunity state, any inter-
est of the state of injury in allowing compensation to the nonresident
plaintiff is "officious and hypothetical" (p. 246). When the conflict
cannot be avoided, however, he would seek a rational basis for resolu-
tion, relying heavily upon four guiding factors.
First is the general movement of substantive tort law toward dis-
tributing losses resulting from accidents, which argues in favor of allow-
ing the plaintiff to recover (p. 204). Secondly, there is the matter of
unfair surprise, which Professor Weintraub does not consider significant
in tort cases.44 Unfair surprise would be relevant only to show that the
nominal defendant did not foresee any liability for his conduct and
therefore failed to take out liability insurance, or that he would have
taken out more liability insurance if he could have foreseen that his
liability would be measured by standards of compensation different
from those in the place where he acted. The insurer also would be
unaffected, for as Professor Weintraub observes, insurance rates are
based not upon individual cases, but upon great numbers of cases, and
"[t]o talk of surprising the insurer is very likely to be talking non-
sense" (p. 206).
Anachronism is a third criterion. When "a rule that is in step with
general modem trends in the area [conflicts with] a rule that is clearly
an anachronistic lag, resolution should be in favor of the rule that is
more representative of current developments" (p. 206). He carefully
distinguishes the anachronism factor from the so-called "better rule"
approach, 45 which he roundly and properly rejects (p. 207). Anachron-
ism is intended as an objective standard: Can it be demonstrated by a
scrutiny of legislative and case developments over past years that the
rule in question is being displaced or modified in favor of the competing
more modern rule? A rule is not anachronistic merely because judges
may deem it undesirable. Guest statutes, he points out, can hardly be
anachronistic when twenty-six states have them and two others require
a showing of more than ordinary negligence for a guest passenger to
recover against his host driver. It should be noted that whenever a court
has looked to the "better rule," that rule has, not coincidentally, been
its own.-6
44 The individual defendant is not likely to have shaped his conduct to take account
of rules of liability for negligence or the measure of damages, and, in any event, is likely
to have been insured.
45 See generally Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 267, 295-804 (1966); Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 1584, 1588 (1966).
46 See, e.g., Conklin v. Homer, 88 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 851, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). For rejections of the "better rule" when it was not the
rule of the forum, see, e.g., Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 298 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Wis. 1968);
Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 487 P.2d
107 (1968).
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Finally, a state's choice of law decisions delineating the cases in
which it would apply its substantive law may serve as a guide to the
purposes underlying that law and the state's interest in, applying it to
the situation in question (pp. 207-08). As a shorthand statement of "all
that has been said," Professor Weintraub proposes the following formu-
lation: "An actor is liable for his conduct if he is liable under the law
of any state whose interests would be advanced significantly by im-
posing liability unless imposition of liability would unfairly surprise
the actor" (p. 209).
I tend to be somewhat skeptical about proposals for resolving true
conflicts, at least in the tort area, primarily because the case in which
the forum would be expected to displace its law under these proposals
is unlikely to arise in practice, and secondly, because whenever a court
has been faced with a true conflict, it has almost invariably applied its
own law-unless it has continued to apply the place-of-wrong rule. In
those true torts conflicts cases that actually arise the forum court gener-
ally applies its own law, as Professor Currie advocates, and more signifi-
cantly, in these cases the commentators that have attempted to resolve
true conflicts would usually agree that this is how the particular case
should have been decided. I will try to illustrate this point with refer-
ence to the formulation that Professor Weintraub has proposed.
Suppose a resident of a state that does not have a guest statute is
injured there while a passenger in a vehicle operated by a driver from
a guest statute state. This obviously presents a true conflict. The victim's
home state is interested in applying its law to allow recovery to its resi-
dent who was injured there. The driver's home state, where the vehicle
is insured and where insurance rates theoretically will be affected, is
equally interested in protecting its resident, or more accurately, his
insurer, no matter where the accident occurs. Professor Currie would
say that the plaintiff's home state should apply its own law in a true
conflict. Professor Weintraub would also resolve the true conflict in
favor of the law of the plaintiff's state, but because its interests would
be advanced significantly by the application of its law and because
the imposition of liability would not unfairly surprise the actor.
They disagree only about what the defendant's home state should do:
Professor Currie would say that it should apply its own law in a true
conflict, and Professor Weintraub would say that it should defer to the
policy of the plaintiff's home state. But this case will never arise. The
plaintiff will sue in his home state, obtaining jurisdiction under the
non-resident motorist or nonresident tortfeasor's act, and that state will
apply its own law, as Professor Currie and Professor Weintraub would
both advocate.47
The strong relationship between jurisdiction and choice of law,
47 See Sedler, supra note 19, at 66-67.
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which Professor Weintraub describes (pp. 67-69), is particularly clear
in terms of predictability of result. In a true conflict case the plaintiff
will sue in his home state if he can obtain jurisdiction there, and that
state is almost certain to apply its own law. Speculating on what the
defendant's home state would or should do if suit were brought there
may be an interesting academic exercise, but it is totally irrelevant to
the realities of conflicts litigation. If plaintiff is unable to obtain juris-
diction in his home state-for example, when he is injured in defen-
dant's home state and defendant is not otherwise amenable to process
in plaintiff's state-he would waste his time suing in defendant's state,
because that state will always apply its own law.48
The choice of forum becomes even more significant when the in-
jury occurs in defendant's home state and the defendant wants the
plaintiff to recover. Guest statute cases are a good example. There will
almost always have been a prior relationship between the parties-the
fictitious ungrateful hitchhiker has not yet made his appearance in an
actual conflicts case-and the nominal defendant will want the plaintiff
to recover against his insurance company. Here again, Professor Wein-
traub, looking to the interest of the plaintiff's home state in allowing
recovery and the clear absence of unfair surprise to either the nominal
defendant or his insurer, would agree that the plaintiff's home state
should apply its own law. A problem may arise, however, because of
what may be called the "territorial hang-up." Plaintiff's home state has
had no difficulty applying its own law when some of the facts leading
up to the accident, such as the origin of the trip, occurred there.49 But
in Cipolla v. Shaposka,50 the accident occurred in Delaware, a guest
statute state, on a trip originating in Delaware, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court became one of the few policy-centered courts in recent
years not to apply its own law in a tort case presenting a true conflict.5
4
sSee, e.g., Satchwill v. Vollrath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
49 See Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Schneider v. Nichols, 280
Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
50 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).51 In Casey v. Manson Constr. Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967), the Oregon
court refused to apply its law allowing recovery for loss of consortium in favor of an
Oregon wife whose husband was injured while on the defendants' property in Washington.
The defendants were Washington corporations registered to do business in Oregon. In
Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (Ist Cir. 1971), it was held that New Hampshire
would not apply its tort law apparently imposing a higher duty of care, in favor of a
New Hampshire plaintiff injured while working on land located in Massachusetts, in a
suit against a corporation having its principal place of business in Massachusetts. The
"territorial imperative" seems even stronger when the injury occurs on the defendant's
land located in another state. Id. at 1152. Professor Weintraub argues that in Casey the
defendant had some nexus with Oregon that made it reasonable for Oregon to assert its
interest (p. 248). I agree. In Barrett, since the corporation was subject to suit in New
Hampshire, it may be assumed that it was doing business there. The issue, however,
involved the duty of care owed to an invitee, and it could be argued that there may have
been some reliance on the Massachusetts standard. Barrett is a hard case, but if the
decision is correct, it is because application of New Hampshire law would have been
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Professor Weintraub would disagree with the result in that case. After
paying some obeisance to the "territorial hang-up" by conceding that
plaintiff's home state should not apply its law unless either the defen-
dant or his injurious conduct had some nexus with it, he proposes an
exception that essentially "swallows up the rule" by enabling the plain-
tiff to recover under his home state's law if he boarded the vehicle there
or the trip was intended to end there (pp. 248-49).52 This exception
covers the few guest statute cases that have arisen in this vein, including
Cipolla. Only the "territorial hang-up" could have caused the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court to decide Cipolla as it did, and here again Pro-
fessors Weintraub and Currie would agree that Pennsylvania should
have applied its own law.
Miller v. Miller58 was another true conflict case in which defendant
wanted plaintiff to recover. At the time of the fatal accident defendant
was a resident of Maine, which then had a $20,000 limitation on dam-
ages recoverable for wrongful death. The victim was defendant's
brother, and the accident occurred while he was visiting defendant in
Maine. The defendant subsequently moved to New York, where his
brother's survivors brought suit. Undoubtedly, even if he had not
moved to New York, he would have allowed himself to be served there.
At the time of the suit Maine had also removed the limitation. The New
York court applied its own law to allow unlimited recovery. Again Pro-
fessor Weintraub agrees with the result, but here on the ground that
post-accident changes in residence may properly be considered in deter-
mining interests where this does not produce unfairness nor penalize a
party for the change of residence (pp. 249-53). The New York court, after
emphasizing its interest in allowing unlimited recovery and the absence
of unfairness to the Maine insurer, noted that defendant was now a
New York resident and that the Maine limitation had since been re-
moved.
I would submit that the result in Miller would have been the same
if the nominal defendant had not changed his residence to New York.
New York had a clear interest in allowing the beneficiaries of a New
York decedent unlimited recovery, particularly against a nominal
defendant who wanted them to recover. The insurance policy covered
out-of-state accidents, and as the court observed, insurance policies do
not distinguish between liability for personal injuries and liability for
wrongful death. Thus, the insurance company could expect to be held
unfair since the defendant may have conformed its behavior to the requirements of the
Massachusetts standard.
52 Though Professor Weintraub disagrees that the exception "swallows up the rule,"
his examples, apart from the guest statutes, involve the unlikely situation of individual
defendants who have been personally served in the forum.
53 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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to unlimited liability, and it was not prejudiced by being held to that
standard merely because the accident had not occurred in New York.
In addition, the insurance company was doubtlessly doing business in
New York, and New York certainly could hold the company to the
New York standard under a benefit theory if one of its residents were
injured by the company's insured elsewhere. 54 Using the interest and
fairness criteria then, the application of New York law would be proper
whenever a New York resident was killed or injured by a person insured
with a company doing business in New York.55 Only the "territorial
hang-up" would produce a different result.
The crucial lesson is that in actual practice tort cases presenting
true conflicts almost invariably follow the substantive law of the forum,
as Professor Currie has advocated. More importantly, the formulation
for resolving true conflicts that Professor Weintraub has proposed would
produce the same result in each of these cases. The cases in which he
would argue that the forum should displace its own law are simply not
likely to arise.56 In terms of predicting the behavior of courts in aetual
cases, I would submit that Professor Currie has carried the day. The
forum will almost invariably apply its own law, unless it has retained
the place-of-wrong rule or is caught in a "territorial hang-up" as in
Cipolla. Relying on the "rational basis" for resolving true conflicts may
be academically interesting, but may not have much relevance for the
real world in which the non-experts must operate.
III. Ti CHAPTER ON CONTRACTS
Professor Weintraub builds his analysis of contracts conflicts prob-
lems around the approach of the Restatement Second, which incorpo-
rates "the two rules that now seem to have emerged from the welter of
contending rules as kings of the hill" (p. 263). These are the rule of
54In Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held that New York
would not apply its law to allow recovery where the guest-passenger was a resident of
New York, the defendant was a resident of Florida, a guest statute state, and the accident
occurred in Ohio, also a guest statute state. Quasi in rem jurisdiction was obtained in
New York by attachment of the insurance policy obligation of the defendant's insurer
under Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). This case
raises most cogently the question of whether the forum should hold an insurer doing
business in the forum to the forum's standard whenever a forum resident is insured by one
of its out-of-state insureds. The court never considered this question, making the
completely erroneous observation that, "we can safely assume that the Swarners'
insurance premiums were calculated with the Florida guest statute in mind." 445 F.2d
at 1272. There was also no discussion of Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). The accident occurred on a return trip from New York to Ohio, and
the trip originated in Ohio. It may be queried whether the New York Court of Appeals
would have reached the same result.
55 See Sedler, The Territorial Imperative, supra note 35, at 406-07.
56 Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971), would perhaps be such a
case. I think Professor Weintraub would disagree with the result in Pryor v. Swarner, 445
F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), since the accident occurred on the return trip from New York.
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party autonomy, which generally permits parties to choose the govern-
ing law, and the "most significant relationship" rule-that in the ab-
sence of an effective choice, the governing law is the law of the state
with "the most significant relationship to the transaction and the par-
ties."5S7 Professor Weintraub begins by drawing the all-important dis-
tinction between matters going to the validity of the contract-under
the domestic law of one state having some contact with the problem a
provision in the contract is invalid, but under the law of another contact
state the same provision is enforceable-and matters of construction,
in which the intent of the parties on some important aspect of their
agreement is unknown and unknowable, and the contact states would
construe the contract differently (pp. 263-64). The great majority of
cases, of course, involve matters going to validity.
Professor Weintraub argues that the parties should be given full
autonomy to choose the governing law with respect to matters of con-
struction, which is in accord with the Restatement's position,58 and with
which I fully agree. 9 However, as to matters going to validity, he rejects
party autonomy on the ground that party autonomy rules "either go
too far or not far enough" (p. 273). If the express choice of law selects
a validating rule, then the court is actually applying a rule of validity;
this should give rise to a presumptive rule of validity in all cases,
whether or not the parties have made an express choice of law (p. 274).
There will be circumstances, however, when functional considerations
will lead the court to find that the presumption of validity has been
rebutted, whether or not the parties have made an express choice of
law (p. 273). Professor Weintraub's essential position, then, is that func-
tional analysis should be employed in contracts cases as in any other.
False conflicts should be identified and the law of the only interested
state applied, while true conflicts should be resolved in accordance with
a rebuttable presumption of validity (pp. 267, 284). His analysis makes
express choice of law irrelevant for all questions of validity. It likewise
requires rejection of the Restatement Second's "state of the most signifi-
cant relationship" rule. Although that rule invites a "process of inquiry
into substantive contract policies," a danger exists that it "will be in-
terpreted to direct the counting of physical contacts with the parties and
with the transaction and the awarding of the palm to the state with the
'most' contacts" (pp. 276-77). The Restatement Second's approach, while
taking policy into account, is essentially a localizing rule built around
factual contacts.60
57 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TmE CONFUCr OF LAWS § 186-88 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as REsrATEMENT SECOND].
58 RESTATEMENT SECOND § 187(1).
59 Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement Second: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 CoLtm. L. REv. 279 (1972).
00 Id.
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I am in basic agreement with Professor Weintraub's view as to party
autonomy and the "state of the most significant relationship" rule. I
would draw the line a little differently, however. On the one side, I
would put matters of construction and matters such as the requirement
of consideration, which, while analytically going to validity, are what
Professor Weintraub calls in another context "a difference of detail
rather than basic policy" (pp. 286-87).61 I would recognize fully the
parties' express choice of law in matters of construction and matters
that do not inVolve a strong policy of the involved states.62 In situations
in which the parties have not made an express choice of law, I would
employ the localizing concept of the "state of the most significant rela-
tionship" rule on the ground that it may serve to determine the parties'
implied intent. In the event factual contacts are so divided between
various states that localization is impossible, and the parties have not
made an express choice of law, I would uphold the contract as to matters
of "non-strong policy validity," and would probably apply the law of
the forum-assuming that it is one of the contact states-to matters
of construction.63
Most cases, however, will involve differing laws about matters that
reflect strong policies of the concerned states, and like Professor Wein-
traub, I would solve these problems by a functional analysis. In the case
of the false conflict, of course, I would apply the law of the only inter-
ested state. Likewise, I would agree that because of the possibility of
reliance on the law of a particular state and because of the common
policy of all states in protecting the legitimate expectations of the par-
ties, the forum may be disposed in a contracts case to find that the con-
flict can be avoided by a more moderate and restrained interpretation
of its own policy and interest. But when a true conflict is clearly pre-
sented, I would have the forum apply its own law, as in torts cases.
Ordinarily application of the forum law will produce no fundamental
unfairness.
At this juncture I again find myself in disagreement with Professor
Weintraub's "rational bases for resolving true conflicts." In the contracts
area, he begins with a rebuttable presumption of validity, which is
justified in his view because of the common policy of all states in "mak-
ing commercial transactions convenient and reliable by enforcing com-
mercial contracts in the absence of compelling countervailing con-
61 As to the significance of the requirement of consideration, for example, see A.
EniREEwEIG, CoN _cr oF LAWS 479-80 (1962). The Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, does not require consideration in the case of firm offers between merchants.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205.
62 See Sedler, supra note 59.
63 Id. Professor Weintraub suggests that rules of construction may also reflect policy
considerations and would approach construction problems in terms of interest analysis
where the contract contains no choice of law clause (pp. 293-94). His point is well taken.
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siderations articulated in a particular invalidating rule" (p. 284).
Professor Weintraub details five criteria for determining whether the
presumption of validity is to be rebutted (pp. 285-92). In view of the
strong presumption of validity he would generally invalidate the con-
tract only where one or more of the following factors is present: (l
the invalidating rule reflects a viable, current trend in the law of con-
tracts such as the growing concern for protection of the party in the
inferior bargaining position; (2) the invalidating rule differs in basic
policy, rather than minor detail, from the validating rule; (3) the parties
should have foreseen the substantial interest that the state with the
validating rule would have in controlling the outcome; (4) the context
of the contract is non-commercial; (5) the courts of the state with the
validating rule have, in similar interstate cases, deferred to policies
underlying the foreign invalidating rule (p. 292).
I contend that in the contracts area, as in torts, the forum court
will apply its own law when a conflict cannot be avoided by a more re-
strained interpretation of the interest of one state,64 and that the result
will not be fundamentally unfair to the other party.6 5 Nevertheless, I do
think that the factors Professor Weintraub has set forth to resolve a true
conflict are very useful in determining how such a conflict can and
should be avoided by a more moderate and restrained interpretation
of the policy or interest of one state. But when this cannot be done, the
forum should, and I would submit does, generally apply its own law.
Finally, I must take serious issue with respect to Professor Wein-
traub's approach to choice of law in claims of usury. He appropriately
distinguishes between usury laws and small loan laws, explaining that
the transactions covered by small loan laws are almost surely adhesive,
but that general commercial loans may or may not be contracts of ad-
hesion (p. 281). He then claims, however, that there is a justifiable dif-
ference in treatment between ordinary commercial loan and small loan
cases, because the difference between small loan laws is one of policy
while that between usury laws is merely one of detail. General usury
statutes vary little in allowable interest rates-differences are seldom
more than one or two percent in conflict cases (p. 287). From Professor
Weintraub, this kind of analysis is surprisingly superficial. The differ-
ence in the policy reflected in usury laws has little to do with the
permissible rate of interest,66 but everything to do with the sanction
64 E.g., Denny v. American Tobacco Co., 208 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
65 See, e.g., Haines, v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W2d 328
(1970); Potlatch No. 1 Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969);
Younker v. Maner, 255 Cal. App. 2d 431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1967); Lilienthal v. Kaufman,
239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
66 However, a difference in interest rates can be very significant in a long-term trans-
action. On a ten-year loan of $10,000, a 2% differential would mean an added payment
of between $1100 and $2000, depending on whether interest was calculated on the
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that is imposed in the case of a usurious contract. The states have
employed widely divergent sanctions to deal with usury, and the nature
of the sanction will demonstrate most clearly the strength of a state's
policy against usury. Some states merely deprive the lender of the
excess interest and fully enforce the contract on the remainder of
the loan. Others require a forfeiture of all interest. Still others require
a forfeiture of a multiple of the interest charged or taken. At the farthest
end of the spectrum, some states, such as New York, hold that a usurious
contract is completely unenforceable, resulting in a forfeiture of all in-
terest and principal. Approximately one-third of the states impose pos-
sible criminal penalties as well.07 The difference between the sanction
of complete forfeiture of all principal and interest and the sanction of
forfeiture of only excess interest cannot by the remotest stretch of the
imagination be characterized as a mere "difference in detail." In Crisa-
fulli v. Childs,6s for example, both states connected with the transaction,
New York and Pennsylvania, allowed only 6 percent interest. The con-
tract called for 10 percent interest. Under Pennsylvania law, however,
only excess interest was forfeited. If Pennsylvania law applied, the bor-
rower would be entitled to recover $165, representing excess interest
already paid. If New York law applied, the contract would be void, and
the borrower would receive a $15,000 "windfall." Surely this does not
reflect a "difference in detail."
As the court in Crisafulli indicated, the real reason for applying
the "rule of validity" in usury cases has been to protect lenders against
such severe sanctions, and the rule in effect is that the court applies the
law of the state having the lightest sanction.69 This is blatant judicial
preference for lenders as a class over borrowers as a class in defiance of
usury policy of a "strong sanction" state and in complete disregard for
the fundamental premises on which interest analysis rests. If Professor
Weintraub is going to advocate this clear departure from interest analy-
sis, he will have to come up with a more convincing reason than that
the difference in usury laws is a "difference in detail." When different
sanctions are employed, the difference is one of basic policy, and the
rate of interest contained in the law of either state is irrelevant.
Usury cases can and should be approached purely in terms of in-
terest analysis. When the contract is usurious under the law of the forum,
and the borrower is a resident of the forum, the forum should apply
declining balance method. See Westen, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of
Lex Debitoris, 55 CAsur. L. R.nv. 123, 229 (1967).
67 Id. at 232-33 nn. 567-75.
68 33 App. Div. 2d 293, 807 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1970).
6 9 In the leading case setting forth the "rule of validity" in usury cases, Seaman v.
Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927), the transaction was usurious under both
New York and Pennsylvania law, and the Court applied Pennsylvania law, imposing
the lighter sanction.
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its law to protect him,70 unless the borrower sought out the lender in
the lender's state and the lender was entitled to rely on the law of that
state.7-1 When the contract is not usurious under the law of the bor-
rower's state, the defense should not be allowed unless the contract is
usurious under the law of the lender's state, and (1) the law of the
lender's state reflects an admonitory policy, 72 and (2) the borrower's
state (if suit is brought there) has no interest in applying its more liberal
usury law to encourage the inflow of foreign capital.73
IV. A CONCLUDING NOTE
Brainerd Currie once observed, "I know of no sincere way to honor
a scholar except to subject his scholarship to critical analysis." 74 My
critical analysis of Commentary on the Conflict of Laws has produced
some disagreement reflective primarily of my different approach to the
resolution of the true conflict. But it has produced most of all a deep
appreciation that the field of the Conflict of Laws has attracted scholars
such as Russell J. Weintraub who have established a basic framework
of scholarship upon which the rest of us can draw in hopes of develop-
ing our own solutions to the problems that arise in that "one litigated
case out of every hundred which may involve a question of the conflict
of laws."7 5
CARVING UP THE URBAN FRINGE
THE ZONING DILEMMA. By Daniel R. Mandelker. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1971. Pp. 196.
Reviewed by A. Dan Tarlock*
For many years Professor Daniel R. Mandelker has ranked among
the most energetic scholars serving the law-in-action tradition of the
University of Wisconsin. Based on a twelve-month examination of apart-
70 See, e.g., Trinidad Indus. Bank v. Romero, 81 N.M. 299, 466 P.2d 568 (1970); Oxford
Consumer Discount Co. v. Stefanelli, 102 N.J. Super. 549, 246 A.2d 460 (1968), modified,
55 N.J. 489, 262 A.2d 874, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 808 (1970). Compare Burr v. Renewal
Guaranty Corp., 105 Ariz. 549, 468 P.2d 576 (1970).
71 See, e.g., Dairy Equip. Co. v. Boehme, 442 P.2d 437 (Idaho 1968); Whitman v. Green,
289 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1961).
72 See Lyles v. Union Planters Natl Bank, 259 Ark. 738, 393 S.W.2d 867 (1965), where
the forum reached this result, but solely on the ground that the contract was made there.
73 For a discussion of the policies reflected in usury laws, see Sedler, supra note 59.
74Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the Rule of
Validation, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 243 n.2 (1965).
75 Wright, supra note 1.
0 Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B., Stanford, 1963; LL.B., 1965.
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